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Introduction
Faced with budget cuts, institutions of higher education have increased tuition in an effort to shore up finances. In each of the last 5 years, tuition and fees at public universities increased at a rate double that of inflation, and they constitute a growing share of institutional budgets. For example, at the University of Iowa, the institution that is the focus of this study, tuition as a percentage of educational expenditures increased from 27% in 1981 to nearly 40% in 2003. In an effort to stem adverse impacts on enrollment, institutions are simultaneously increasing their use of tuition discounts. It also appears that institutional autonomy in establishing tuition is being threatened and that changes on the horizon may affect institutions' ability to package financial aid to achieve their educational mission. Various levels of government have either intervened or threatened to intervene in the college price-setting market. Attracting the most attention of late was a proposal by Rep. Howard P. (Buck) McKeon, a senior member of the powerful House Education and the Workforce Committee. Rep. McKeon proposed (and then withdrew) a bill that would penalize colleges that raise tuition excessively by preventing them from participating in some federal student aid programs (Burd, 2003) . McKeon stated, "We can no longer stand idly by while our nation's students, the future of our country, are being priced out of the promise of higher education" (Burd, 2003, p. A26) . One of the implications of McKeon's statement is that college access, retention, and graduation are sensitive to both tuition and financial aid, and that institutions are well informed about these relationships.
However, our understanding of these complex relationships may be deficient. For instance, the modeling strategies used in the past have been successful in improving our understanding of student college choice, but these approaches often assume the independence of the application, admission, and enrollment stages. Many models designed to explain student access to college also assume that financial aid distribution is exogenous. It has long been known, however, that these assumptions may not be tenable. The analytic strategy employed in this study allows us to model more adequately the dependence among the application, admission, financial aid determination, and enrollment decisions by the development of an integrated model of student choice. In this model we simultaneously estimate application, admission, and enrollment behavior, and we control for the non-random assignment of financial aid. This approach not only permits us to estimate the enrollment effects of policy changes like those proposed by McKeon, but we can also investigate the impact that these changes have on applications to the institution.
Models of Student Choice
The student college choice literature details that the college decisionmaking process involves a number of stages through which students pass. For example, Kotler and Fox (1985) suggested a seven-stage model, but most other researchers focus on fewer stages. Most models of student choice define three broad stages (Davis-Van Atta & Carrier, 1986; Hanson & Litten, 1982; Hossler & Gallagher, 1987; Jackson, 1982) . The most well known model of this type is that of Hossler, Braxton, and Coopersmith (1989) . In the first stage of their model, students form college aspirations and a myriad of factors and processes influence a student's predisposition toward higher education. The formation of these aspirations may take place over a long period, from early childhood through high school and beyond. Although this stage certainly varies by individual, students typically develop the predisposition for college when they are in primary or secondary school (Hossler, Schmit, & Vesper, 1999) . For instance, students undertake a number of preparations in anticipation of college attendance (e.g., taking college prepara-tory courses in high school) and they begin to interact with colleges to form predispositions toward college.
The second stage (search) involves identification of and application to a select number of colleges. During this stage, students acquire information from various sources (e.g., institutions, peers, parents) about colleges they are considering (Flint, 1992) . Students also take entrance examinations (e.g., the SAT and ACT) that are required by some two-year and most four-year institutions. When they take these tests, they can choose to have their scores sent to a number of colleges or universities, and that select group typically comprises what is known as the student's "choice set" (Paulsen, 1990; Weiler, 1990) . 1 The search stage ends when a student applies to one or more institutions.
The final phase (choice) involves admission, college enrollment, and actual attendance. During this stage, institutions to which the student applied decide whether to admit the student, and conditional on admission, the student must then decide whether to accept their offer. During this stage individuals also need to decide whether to apply for financial aid to help defray the costs of attendance. Ultimately, the student weighs the alternatives and chooses to enroll in one of the institutions included in the choice set.
Although it is widely accepted that the college choice process involves multiple stages, most empirical work has focused on the choice stage. College choice models predict student behavior in choosing a particular school as a function of students' individual characteristics, perceptions, and preferences about the school (Fuller, Manski, & Wise, 1982; Hossler, Braxton, & Coopersmith, 1989; Kohn, Manski, & Mundel, 1976; Paulsen, 1990; Weiler, 1990; Welki & Navratil, 1987) . The results obtained from these studies suggest that the characteristics of students (e.g., race, gender, marital status, family income, parents' educational attainment and occupational status, academic ability and achievement), institutional characteristics (e.g., tuition, financial aid, home location, reputation, selectivity, special programs, and curriculum), and contextual factors (e.g., parental encouragement, teacher encouragement, and peers' plans) influence students' application and enrollment decisions. Most studies of college choice have focused on undergraduates, but several studies have also examined the college choice decisions of graduate students (Hearn, 1987; Kallio, 1995) .
A number of studies of student choice have focused on the role of tuition and costs of attendance (Dynarski, 2000; Ehrenberg & Sherman,Becker, 1963) , transportation-mode choices (McFadden, 1976) , recreation demand (Parsons, 2000) , family labor supply (van Soest, 1995) , and brand choice (Abe, 1998) . RUMs can also be used to study student choice, with the underlying assumption being that students have a set of schooling and non-schooling alternatives and they will attempt to maximize their net utility when making their schooling decisions.
Following Manski (1977) , there are two main components of the RUM: a deterministic component and a stochastic component. The latter accounts for the fact that the researcher has incomplete information (is uncertain) about the utility function of students. The uncertainty can arise from a number of sources: unobserved individual attributes, unobserved attributes of the alternatives available, measurement errors, and instrumental or proxy variables (Manski, 1977) . Thus, "the distinguishing feature of this theoretical perspective is that a potential stochastic nature is attributed to individual utility" (Corstjens & Gautschi, 1983, p. 23) . Applied to the study of college choice, this model can be formally represented by:
where U i a is the utility that student i derives from choosing college a; D i a is the deterministic component and ε i a represents the stochastic or uncertainty described above. This can be transformed into a probabilistic statement:
indicating the probability that student i will choose alternative a given choice set C (which may contain labor market and alternative schooling options), and U i b represents the utilities derived from the alternatives to college a.
Although a student's utility is strictly unobservable, we infer utility maximization by observing the actual choices made. When a student chooses institution a over other alternatives (represented by b), we infer that a provided the student with greater net benefits (utility) than entering the labor market or attending any other institution. We model the latent or unobserved component using y*, defined as the difference between the utility derived from choosing college a versus choosing a competing alternative. Formally, this is denoted as:
where β 'χ is known as the "index function" and ε is an error term assumed to be logistically distributed. The link between the observable choice (y) and the latent variable (y*) is "made with a simple measurement equation" (Long & Freese, 2001, p. 100) where:
In the context of student choice, this framework provides the theoretical basis for the probability that a student makes a particular choice, such as whether to send their scores to the study institution, whether to apply, and, if admitted, whether to enroll (see Manski, 1977 , for details on the random utility model, and Greene, 1993 , for the econometric specification of latent variable models and their assumptions). The decisions institutions make about admitting a particular student parallel the decision-making structure discussed above. Institutions typically set some minimum score on an examination test, high school grade point average (or percentile), or combination of these quantitative measures, and students who have scores that exceed this minimum are automatically admitted. There is often a "review range" over which student applications are more closely scrutinized. These threshold scores and review ranges may vary for different groups of students. For instance, non-resident students may be held to a higher minimum admissions score than residents, or students who want to enroll in engineering may need minimum scores that exceed those of students seeking admission into a liberal arts curriculum. Also, additional criteria may be used for students entering specific colleges or majors. For instance, prospective engineering students may be required to have no deficiencies in their mathematics high school preparation requirements, or may be required to have successfully completed specific courses, such as introductory calculus, before being admitted. In any case, institutions attempt to admit students that will fit with their institutional mission and goals. Typically, these goals include crafting a class that will provide enough enrollees to "pay the bills," achieving a level of diversity in keeping with the institution's mission, and enrolling a class whose academic promise is congruent with faculty expectations.
The Empirical Approach
Studies of student choice have typically focused on the very end of the search stage, where students make decisions about which institution to attend among the group of schools to which they have been admitted.
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Thus, many studies have focused on the effects of factors thought to influence enrollment decisions (conditional on admission), principally the tuition rates students face and the types and amounts of financial aid offered to the individual (Braunstein, McGrath, & Pescatrice, 1999; Brooks, 1996; Manski & Wise, 1983; St. John, 1990) . The literature also contains a number of studies that model application behavior (DesJardins, Dundar, & Hendel, 1999; Venti & Wise, 1982; Weiler, 1990) , but there are few, if any, models of the institutional admission decision process. In this study, we model the institutional admission decision in order to determine how a student's probability of admission influences application behavior. There is evidence that students are aware of the academic requirements of colleges and that they tend to apply to institutions where students with similar academic backgrounds attend (Fuller, Manski, & Wise, 1982; Kohn, Manski, & Mundel, 1976) . If this is the case, then application and admission decisions are not independent and need to be modeled jointly.
As noted above, there may be problems with an analytic strategy that focuses only on enrollment conditional on admission. The application, admission, aid determination, and enrollment processes are sequential and correlated and should be modeled as such. Based on economic theory, our a priori hypothesis is that students make decisions based on their expectations and that these expectations should also be included in student choice models. For instance, students tend to apply to institutions where they have a reasonable expectation of being admitted. Likewise, students form their choice sets based on their expectations of financial aid. If the latter is true, then changes in aid packaging not only directly affect enrollments but also have an impact on application decisions. Modeling the structure of these interrelated events (see Figure 1 ) may provide a new understanding of the process of student choice, thereby adding to the literature in this area.
Controlling for the Non-Random Nature of Financial Aid Application and Receipt
Whether a particular student receives financial aid is not randomly distributed among all applicants to an institution. Some students choose not to apply for aid, others apply for aid but do not receive it, and based on their individual characteristics, many students apply for and receive some sort of financial support from government, institutional, and/or outside sources. In order to control for the non-random nature of aid distribution, and to produce estimates of these outcomes to be used in other equations, we estimated the probability of receipt of aid and the amount students expect to receive if they had applied for aid.
First, conditional on applying for financial aid, we estimated the probability of being awarded financial aid and, conditional on applying and being awarded aid, the amount of aid awarded. We then used these equations to estimate the probability of receiving aid and the amount of aid that could be expected for all students, irrespective of whether they applied for or were awarded aid. We took this approach because we think that all students consider financial aid in their college decisions but some do not apply because they think they will not receive aid or will not receive much aid even if they are awarded it. However, these calculations (or expectations) affect their decisions. Many universities provide early information about the types of financial aid they award, and this information allows students to form expectations about the amount of aid they may receive (although the amount and quality of information provided may vary greatly). Many colleges and universities market their merit aid early and often. 5 Many post the criteria for awarding aid on their Web sites so that students and parents can evaluate their probable aid award. In addition, there are books, Web sites, interactive tools, and commercial advisors that allow students to form expectations about the probability and amount of aid they may receive. However, the extent to which students actually form such expectations is the subject of considerable debate. For example, in a recent article in the Chronicle of Higher Education (Glenn, 2004) , Lutz Berkner, a researcher at MPR Associates, challenged the idea that researchers can "figure out how much financial aid students who didn't apply to college and didn't apply for financial aid would have gotten if they did." He stated, "We can't do that. Nobody can do it, although you can make up the numbers" (p. A24). In our study we estimate aid for students who did not receive it, but we did not "make up the numbers." Rather, we employed an analytic approach that has been used in economics (and other disciplines) for over 30 years. For instance, labor economists have long estimated the expected wages of women who do not work to study the impact of wages on female labor supply (Killingsworth, 1983; Mroz, 1987) . We used a parallel method to estimate expected aid for students who applied for admission to the study institution but did not receive financial aid. These estimates were based on the characteristics and experiences of students who actually applied for and were awarded aid.
The regressors in the aid equations (shown in Table 1A ; descriptive statistics and definitions provided in Table 1 ) were included based on conceptual theory or because they were used in the aid determination formula employed by the study institution (the Free Application for Federal Student Aid, or FAFSA). Because many scholarships are merit based, students with better academic records should have higher probabilities of being awarded aid and of receiving more merit aid. We captured academic quality by ACT Composite score; high school rank percentile; ranked first in one's high school class; high school GPA; taking advanced placement courses; the number of years of math, English, and natural and social sciences taken in high school; and whether the student aspires to a post baccalaureate degree. There are a number of personal characteristics that may be related to financial aid determination, including race, ethnicity, gender, the number of siblings in college, whether the student intended to major in engineering, whether the student graduated from a private high school, the student's home state, and whether the student was married or a veteran. Married students are treated as independent and thus are not evaluated based on their parents' income. Veterans get special treatment and are eligible for sources of aid not provided to non-veterans. Full-time students get preference in Pell grants, and at the study institution, there are special scholarships for engineering students. Because many aid programs are means tested, families from high-income groups are likely to have lower probabilities of receiving aid and may receive less aid even if awarded it. We also included several variables that capture the competitive environment for financial aid. The greater the rate of growth of the number of 12th graders in Iowa or in the home state of out-of-state students, the greater the number of applications for aid and thus the lower the probability of receiving aid. A larger cohort of potential applicants from Iowa may also lead to lower aid awards. A higher unemployment rate in Iowa may signal a tighter financial climate for the university, resulting in a lower probability of aid and reduced aid awards. A higher unemployment rate in surrounding states may lead more students to apply out-of-state, including to schools in Iowa, thus decreasing the probability of being awarded aid. Some states are high tuition-high aid states, Iowa is a low tuition-low aid state, and therefore we expect the probability of being awarded aid and the amount of aid awarded to increase as tuition increases. In addition, higher tuition may allow a student to get a larger Pell grant. The competitive environment variables differ between in-state and out-ofstate students and also vary over time (we have five cohorts of entering students). We controlled for any cohort differences in financial aid by including a set of year-specific dummy variables.
Formally, we estimated the probability of students receiving financial aid using:
where AidRcpt i = log ; p i is the probability that applicants to the institution will receive financial aid; X i is a vector of regressors discussed above, α and π are coefficients to estimate; and ω i represents a random error term which is logistically distributed. The predicted probabilities of aid receipt produced by (1) were saved and used in some of the equations discussed below. Next, we estimated an ordinary least squares regression for the amount of aid awarded conditional on the student having applied to the institution and having received financial aid. The model is specified as:
where AidAmt i is the amount of aid an admitted student can expect given observable characteristics; X i is the vector of regressors discussed above, α and ψ are estimated coefficients; and ℑ i represents a random error term that is normally distributed. The results produced by (2) were conditional on students having received aid and provided us with a predicted amount of total aid for each person who applied to the institution. These estimated dollar values were saved and used to create structural variables included in the integrated model discussed below. 6
Estimating the Probability of Admission Conditional on the student applying to the institution, whether a student is admitted was regressed not only on some of the same variables used in (1) and (2) but also on other variables that are specific to and important in making admissions decisions. Student quality is important in the admission decision and is captured principally by the admissions index score (AIS). The AIS is a weighted average of the ACT Composite and high school rank percentile and is defined as [(2*ACT)+HSR%)]. To assist them in making admissions decisions, institutions of higher education often use an index like this one, which is used at the study institution. We parsed the AIS into categories that represent the institution's automatic admission range, the review range, and the rejection range. These variables represented a linear "spline" of the admissions index with "knots" at the relevant decision-making thresholds (see Marsh & Cormier, 2001 on the use of splines). The coefficients on these variables measured the slopes of the defined intervals, allowing us to observe whether admissions probabilities differed greatly (as expected) over the range of index scores. In addition to the AIS, we also included other measures of student quality that should increase the probability of admission-namely, whether the student met the high school preparation requirements, whether the student had taken advanced placement courses in high school, the student's high school grade point average, whether the student placed first in their class, whether the student aspired to postbaccalaureate study, and whether the student graduated from a private high school. The admissions committee may also attempt to achieve diversity in the student body and may take into account the applicant's race, ethnicity, gender, family income, home location, and other college preferences. Admission requirements also differ among majors and programs, and engineering has an admissions limit, so a set of dummies for the college and program applied to were included. We also added cohort controls and a measure of the growth in the size of the 12th grade cohort within one's state of residence. The greater the growth in the latter, the greater is the competition for places, and the lower the probability of admission.
Although the decision to apply logically precedes the decision on admission, we estimated the admission decision first because the estimated probability of admission was used in the application model (discussed below) to control for the possibility that students evaluate their chances of being admitted to an institution before applying. Formally, whether a student was admitted is modeled as:
where Admit i = log ; p i is the probability that student i will be admitted by the study institution; A i is a vector of regressors listed in Table  3A ; α and φ are coefficients to be estimated; and u i represents a random error term which is logistically distributed.
Modeling Application and Enrollment
Next, we modeled the probability of application for each student in the sample (conditional on having sent her or his entrance examination scores to the institution). Formally, the application model is defined as:
where Apply i = log ; p i is the probability that student i will apply to the study institution; K i represents a vector of factors related to application behavior (see DesJardins, Dundar, & Hendel, 1999; Venti & Wise, 1982; Weiler, 1990) ; α and τ are estimated coefficients; and ε i represents a random error term which is logistically distributed (see Table 4A for the variables included). Students who have been more successful in high school are more likely to apply to college. Again, we captured student quality by ACT Composite scores; high school rank percentile; ranked first in one's high school class; whether the student aspires to postbaccalaureate study; and whether the student has taken advanced placement classes and more years of math, science, and English in high school. Two variables (come from a city of more than 250,000 people and prefer a college with more than 20,000 students) captured student preferences that may predispose them to applying to a large university such as the University of Iowa. Two variables relate to the student's family (family income and whether the parents were college graduates) were also included. We expected each of these variables to increase the likelihood that a student will apply to college, either by increasing the ability to attend or by shaping one's preferences for college. An increase in size of the 12th grade cohort indicates an increase in competition for college places and may lead students to apply to a wider group of schools including the University of Iowa. An increasing unemployment rate implies a decrease in the opportunity cost of college and an increase in college applications. We expected applications to Iowa to decline as Iowa tuition increased and to rise as tuition in other states increased. Applications should also be more likely from in-state students and students who live closer to the University of Iowa. Also included were sex, race, ethnicity, cohort, and program controls (the latter captures unobserved differences in programs at the University).
In addition, the application equation includes regressors that controlled for the probability of admission given application to the institution (produced by the admission regression detailed above), the expected aid amount for all applicants (defined as the probability of aid receipt times the predicted aid amount produced by equations 1 and 2 above), the expected aid amount for all applicants weighted by their probability of admission, and the squares of the probability of admission and expected amount of aid. We included both the expected aid amount for all applicants and the expected aid amount for all applicants weighted by their probability of admission, because the value of the latter will be much different from the former (unweighted) amount for students who are very unlikely to be admitted to the study institution. The basis for including these structural variables was that we believe application behavior is based on a prospective student's assessment of the net benefits derived by applying to a particular institution. These net benefits are a function of the probability of admission and the expected amount of aid, given acceptance. We had no reason to suspect that the net benefits were linear in these variables, so we also included the squares of these structural variables to capture any non-linearity in these regressors.
We believe that enrollment decisions are not only affected by the level of expected aid, but are also sensitive to deviations of actual awards from their expected level. As we noted above, this belief is not universally accepted. It is, however, an empirical question (since we cannot get inside the heads of students while they make college decisions), and we tested this hypothesis in this study. Thus, the final equation to estimate was the probability of enrollment conditional on a student's being admitted to the institution. We estimated this probability using:
where Enroll i = log ; p i is the probability that student i will enroll in the study institution; Z i is a vector of regressors; α and γ are estimated coefficients; and v i represents a random error term which is logistically distributed. 
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The variables that affect enrollment are similar to those that affect application behavior: student quality, family characteristics, institutional preferences, tuition, opportunity costs, and the competitive environment. As the college environment becomes more competitive, a student is more likely to accept an offer of admission from Iowa. In addition, like many other universities and colleges, the University of Iowa favors legacy applicants, and so we included a variable indicating whether the applicant is a legacy. We also included two new variables that measure differences in aid expectations. We hypothesized that students who receive "positive surprises" will be more likely to enroll than will those who receive "negative surprises." Operationally, if the difference between total aid awarded and expected aid is positive, then:
otherwise PositiveAid = 0. Whereas if the difference between total aid awarded and expected aid is negative then:
otherwise NegativeAid = 0. The coefficients on these variables measure the effects of aid in excess of (less than) what was expected. Also included in the enrollment model was a structural variable that incorporates the amount of aid an applicant is predicted to receive, multiplied (or weighted) by the probability of receiving aid. This measure (labeled Expected Financial Aid in Table 2 ) is the expected value of aid for all applicants. We also included the square of this variable to capture any nonlinearity in this regressor. One source of identification in the financial aid and admissions equations was based on the notion that financial aid officers treat instate applicants differently than they treat out-of-state applicants but that, otherwise, an applicant's distance from the University is not a factor in their award decisions. This may be because in-state students areeligible for some aid types that are not available to students from other states. Students, on the other hand, base college application and enrollment decisions on the distance between college and home. While instate/out-of-state is an important distinction to students, conditional on distance, we assumed that the importance is via the enhanced probability of admission and the increased expected value of financial aid conditional on admission.
The Sample
Our sample included students who sent their ACT scores to the study institution for admission consideration in the academic years [1997] [1998] Integrated Model of Student Choice 395 through 2001-2002. Our original sample was quite large (N = 97,636) and consisted of individual-, institutional-, and state-level data for each of these 5 academic years (see Table 1 for definitions of variables). Individual-level variables included demographic, high school information, preference information, and financial information. Institutionallevel data included information from the application for admission (e.g., parents' education level and whether the student was a legacy). State-level data included the yearly unemployment and public fouryear tuition rates in the prospective student's home state, and information about the growth of the 12th grade cohort in one's state of residence.
Based on observable characteristics, and as suggested above, there were differences in the sample of score senders, applicants, admits, and enrollees (see Table 1 ). After deleting records with missing information, we had an effective sample of over 86,000 score senders, over 40% of whom applied to the institution. Of the over 36,000 applicants in the 5 years examined, nearly 90% of these prospective students were granted admission, and 47% of admitted students eventually enrolled.
There was evidence that students self-select throughout the college choice process. For instance, the average ACT composite score and high school rank percentile scores were higher for applicants than for score senders, suggesting that lower-scoring students were less likely to apply to the institution than their higher scoring counterparts were. There was also evidence that students with deficiencies in the high school preparation requirements were less likely to apply to the institution than were their higher scoring counterparts. For instance, the application percentages of students with deficiencies in English and natural sciences were 4% lower than the percentages of score senders without these deficiencies.
With regard to racial and ethnic distributions at each stage, African Americans comprised 2.8% of all score senders, 2.6% of applicants, and 2.2% of admitted and enrolled students. Although the percentage of enrollees was slightly lower than that of score senders, the institution was enrolling an equal percentage of all African American students who met the admissions requirements. Latino/a students were about 1.7% of all score senders, yet they comprised 2.1% of applicants, admits, and enrollees. About 19% of all score senders were from states other than Iowa or Illinois (the latter being a major source of prospective students). They constituted 14% of those admitted yet only 8.2% of students who eventually enroll. This result was consistent with the literature that documents the difficulty in attracting students from out-of-state. Figure 1 due to the deletion of missing data. n.a. means data is not available because it is provided on the application for admission When relevant, variable names in parentheses are reference groups
Results
Issues of Interpretation The application, admission, and enrollment equations estimated in this study were highly non-linear, making any simple interpretation of the effects of individual variables difficult. Log-odds, which are usually reported in studies employing logistic regression estimation, are appropriate for dummy variables, but for continuous variables, they are dependent upon the unit of measurement. However, log-odds are very difficult to interpret for non-linear variables. Thus, we will report log-odds ratios when appropriate; when this is not appropriate, we opt to calculate and save predicted probabilities for each individual in the sample and then chart these probabilities for selected subgroups (see Long & Freese, 2001 , for a discussion of interpreting the results produced by non-linear models). One advantage of this process is that the analyst can choose to set variables of interest at some meaningful values, while holding other regressors in the model constant at their mean values (or other policy relevant values). We believe this is an effective method of examining how changes in important variables affect the probabilities of an event, and we employ this strategy in our discussion of the results.
Financial Aid Determination
Given the likely endogeneity of financial aid, we estimated the probability of aid receipt (whether a student received aid or not) and we predicted the total aid amount all applicants could expect based on their characteristics (the results are presented in the Appendix in Tables 1A  and 2A , respectively). The predicted values produced by these two equations were used in subsequent equations so that we could test the effect that changes in aid probabilities and amounts (i.e., "expected aid") had not only on enrollment behavior but also on application behavior.
Although our main focus was not on how individual factors explain aid receipt, we noted that African Americans and Latinos have higher probabilities of aid receipt and received more aid than White students received; that the higher one's family income the lower the probability of aid receipt and amount of aid awarded; high ability students had increased chances of getting aid; Iowans tended to have lower chances of aid receipt than their out-of-state counterparts have; and aid probabilities decreased but the amount awarded increased when the university was under tighter economic constraints (measured by the state unemployment rate). When tuition rose in Iowa, so too did the probability of receipt and amount of aid awarded, and when competition for places increased (measured by changes in the growth of the 12th grade population), the probability of being awarded aid increased. The competition for places results run counter to our a priori expectations.
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Other findings worth noting about how much aid a student receives (conditional on receipt) are that high ability students tended to receive lower levels of aid than students with lower ACT scores and high school rank percentiles received; families with more siblings under the age of 21 got higher levels of aid; there appears to have been more aid awarded in the late 1990s than in the early 2000s; aid amounts tended to drop (for Iowans) when the unemployment rate was higher; and higher average tuition rates in Iowa tended to be related to higher aid amounts.
The Congruence of the Admission Index and the Probability of Admission
Next, we estimated the probability of admission for all applicants (results displayed in Table 3A ). As noted in the Methods section above, the inclusion of a spline of the admission index score (AIS) to test whether there were specific points at which the probabilities of admission change dramatically seemed effective. For instance, the regression results (see Table 3A and Figure 2 for details) indicated that the probability of being admitted to the study institution was very low for students with admissions index scores in the 0 to 70 range. However, students with scores in the 71 to 110 range had rapidly increasing probabilities of admission (the function was very steep over these ranges). Toward the top end of the AIS distribution, the function was relatively flat, as virtually all students with scores above the automatic admit cut points were admitted. For instance, students applying to the College of Engineering typically needed a minimum admissions index score of 120 to be automatically admitted, whereas Liberal Arts applicants needed only a 90. As is the case in most institutions, these requirements are somewhat flexible depending on other factors considered by the institution (e.g., deficiencies in the high school preparation requirements, special talents).
The spline results discussed above accurately describe the shape of the admissions probabilities at different levels of the AIS; they appear to be an effective way of modeling the non-linearity in admissions probabilities rather than using higher order polynomials that are often hard to interpret.
The AIS variable captured most of the information available on student quality, although the foreign language requirement and number of years of math taken also influenced the chance of admission. A stated preference for attending a large school increased the chance of admission, as did a family income of $60,000 or more. The University appears
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to have pursued a diversity policy because, when other factors were held constant, females, African Americans, and Hispanics had a higher probability of admission. It did not appear that non-residents were held to a higher admission standard than Iowans were, but there was evidence that engineering and some other programs had higher admission standards.
Application Probabilities
We maintain that student expectations of admission and financial aid affect their application behavior, and so we included the probability of admission given application to the institution, the expected aid amount for all applicants, the expected aid amount for applicants weighted by their probability of admission, and the squares of the probability of admission and the expected aid amount in the admissions equation (see Table 4A for results).
We found that a number of factors, in addition to the probability of admission and receipt of aid, affected application behavior. We found that application probabilities were higher for high ability students, and women have application probabilities that are 22% higher than those of men. Asian American and Latino/a students had odds of applying that were 85% and 27% (respectively) higher than the odds of their White counterparts. For every 100 miles in distance from the campus, the odds of applying were lowered by about 9%. Students who aspired to a postbaccalaureate degree were more likely to apply than were students who did not. Application probabilities rose steeply with income, and higher unemployment rates in other states and higher average tuition at public four-year institutions outside Iowa increased applications. There were some differences in application propensities by intended major, with communications, health-related, social science, and arts majors drawing applications. Students who had taken science and language advanced placement courses in high school tended to apply to the institution at higher rates. Prospective students who did not meet the high school preparation requirements for English, mathematics, natural sciences, and foreign language had lower application probabilities, indicating some self-selection on the part of students. Perhaps the most important finding regarding application behavior was that expected aid was significantly related to application behavior.
The impact of the expected probability of admission and the financial aid variables is best investigated by using simulations because these variables are highly non-linear. In Figure 3 , we examined the application responsiveness of a subgroup of students to changes in their expected levels of financial aid (see the note at the bottom of the figure for detailed information about the characteristics of the students included in this simulation). In this simulation we allowed the expected amount of aid to vary, and held the probability of admission constant at the mean value (0.6) of the group of students being examined (holding all other variables constant at their averages). Generally, we observed that increases in expected aid increased the probabilities of application, but these effects varied quite dramatically by the level of tuition in one's home state and by the amount of expected aid assumed. What is interesting is that at very low tuition levels in one's state of residence, expected aid did not appear to have much of an effect on getting students to apply to the study institution. At low levels of tuition in the state of residence, it took very high aid expectations to increase one's application probability appreciably.
One of the arguments for having aid programs is to equalize access for groups with differing abilities to pay. We were curious whether aid expectations can be used to equalize application probabilities. Figure 4 provides the results of a simulation designed to answer this question. Initially, we set expected aid to $3,000 for White males who are not
Integrated Model of Student Choice 407
from Iowa, and we held constant their probability of admission at 0.6. We then plotted the application probabilities for these students against the average four-year tuition rate in the states from which these students resided, and did so for two income groups: students from families with incomes of less than $18,000, and those from families with incomes of $100,000 or more. When we ran this simulation, not surprisingly we observed the following pattern: High-income students had the highest probabilities of applying (depicted by a line with boxes in Figure 4) ; the other line (with small diamonds) represents the application probabilities of low-income students. Our objective was to see how much we needed to increase low-income students' expected aid in order to equate their probabilities of application to those of the high-income group. That is, how much did we need to increase expected aid in order to move the low-income function up to be coterminous with the high-income curve? We found that expected aid needed to increase from $3,000 to $8,000 (167%) for low-income students in order to equate their application chances to those of high-income students.
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FIG. 3. Probability of Application by Home State Tuition Responsiveness Given Different Assumptions about Expected Aid
Estimating the Probability of Enrollment
The results for the enrollment regression are shown in Table 2 , and Tables 3 and 4 report a series of simulations. Students with higher test scores and better high school grades were less likely to enroll. The probabilities of African American and Hispanic students enrolling were substantially below those of White students. Higher-income students, legacies, and students whose parents are college graduates also had greater propensities to enroll than their counterparts. As in the case of admissions, preferences matter, and students who like large schools had odds of enrolling that were approximately 30% higher than students who prefer a smaller institution. Although opportunity costs (measured by the unemployment rate in one's home state) were found to influence applications, we did not find them to affect the enrollment probability at Iowa. Competition for places (proxied for by 12th grade population growth) did not affect enrollment, but the level of average tuition in states other than Iowa did. That is, the higher the tuition level in one's home state, the more likely these out-of-state students were to enroll at Iowa. Table 3 presents predicted probabilities of enrollment by family income and race/ethnicity. The top panel of the table presents the predicted probabilities of enrollment for the mythical "average" student (i.e., all the regressors were held constant at their respective means). In general, enrollment probabilities increased with income, and there was substantial variability within an income group. For instance, in the $42,000 to $50,000 family income range, the probabilities of enrollment were quite similar for Whites and Asian Americans, and they were similar for African Americans and Latino/a students, but the latter two groups had chances of enrolling that were over 40% lower than the former two groups.
In the middle panel, we examine the effect of changes in expected aid on enrollment probabilities. We set expected aid equal to zero for all admitted students (and hold other factors constant at their means) and found that enrollment probabilities dropped precipitously compared to the baseline (average) probabilities displayed in the top panel. For instance, low-income White students had a baseline probability of enrollment of .33 (see top panel), but when they do not expect to receive financial aid their predicted probability fell to .17, a reduction of nearly 50%.
In the bottom panel, we assume expected aid levels of $4,000 for all students (the average expected aid is about $2,450), and the probabilities of enrollment increased relative to the baseline results. Low-income White students' probabilities of enrollment increased to .58 over the baseline of .33, an 81% increase. These results suggest enrollment propensities were related to expectations, and institutional efforts to inform students about their chances of receiving aid and the amounts they can expect may have positive enrollment effects. Although many studies have documented the effect of actual aid on enrollment behavior, these results provide empirical evidence that student enrollment behavior is also influenced by students' expectations of aid. The results presented above provide considerable empirical support that aid expectations are significantly related to application and enrollment behavior.
We also estimated how discrete changes in expected aid affected students' predicted enrollment probabilities (presented below but not tabled). Examination of these effects permitted us to determine the enrollment responsiveness of students to specific changes in financial aid expectations (again, all other regressors were held constant at their mean values). We found that, when expected aid was increased, effect sizes (marginals) first rose and then fell. For instance, when expected aid increased from zero to $1,000, the enrollment probability increased by .14; the change was .33 when expected aid increased from $1,000 to $2,000; .32 when aid changed from $2,000 to $3,000; .13 when expected aid increased from $3,000 to $4,000; and .03 when aid changed from $4,000 to $5,000. After that the predicted probabilities did not change very much (i.e., the effect is about .01 for an increase from $5,000 to $6,000). These results provide evidence that measures of aid responsiveness are sensitive to the base level of aid from which the changes are being calculated. Table 4 presents the results when we simulated all combinations of expected and actual aid from zero to $10,000. That is, we set actual aid equal to zero and allowed expected aid to vary over the zero to $10,000 range. Then, we set actual aid to $1,000 and allowed expected aid to vary over the zero to $10,000 range (and so on; other regressors included in the model were set to their mean values). A careful examination of this table reveals that students who receive less aid than expected were less likely to enroll than students who receive aid in excess of their expectations. The diagonal in Table 4 represents every dollar combination where expected and actual aid were equal. Averaging over all cells of predicted probabilities of enrollment above the diagonal reveals that students who are disappointed (receive less aid than expected) had about a .68 chance of enrolling. Averaging over all cells below the diagonal (students who receive aid in excess of their expectations) reveals an average probability of enrollment of .89. One should note that the magnitudes of the enrollment probabilities are very different above and below the diagonal. For instance, students who expect and receive aid of $3,000 had enrollment probabilities of .80. If actual aid exceeds their $3,000 expectation by $1,000 (actual aid equals $4,000), their enrollment probability increased to .87, a 9% increase. If actual aid is less than their $3,000 expectation by $1,000 (actual aid equals $2,000), their enrollment probability decreased to .63, a 20% decrease in enrollment probability. These results indicate that the effect that aid expectations have on enrollment probabilities are asymmetric. The table also provides evidence that the congruence between a student's aid expectations and what they are offered can dramatically affect their probability of enrollment.
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The Robustness of the Results
The results discussed above assume that throughout the college choice process, there is no selection based on unobserved variables. To test the robustness of our results to this assumption, we applied Heckman's (1979 Heckman's ( , 1990 two-stage method. We first modeled a (reduced form) decision to apply equation which includes all direct and indirect determinants of the decision to apply, and then we used estimates from this equation to "correct" for the potential selection bias introduced into the financial aid and admission equations due to the application process (see Goldhaber & Eide, 2003 , for an application of the Heckman procedure to an education research issue). For this sample, there were no material differences in the results produced using our structural modeling approach or those using Heckman's two-stage method.
In addition, because our equations included data gathered at the individual-and macro-level (e.g., unemployment, tuition, and population growth data are aggregated at the state level), and because our equations included structural variables like expected aid and the probability of admission, it is possible that the standard errors produced by our analytic approach were biased. To test for this possibility we used a bootstrap procedure in which we resampled from the original data set (1,000 times) and repeated the original analysis on each of these replicated samples, thereby allowing us to test the robustness of our measures of uncertainty (standard errors) on the variables included in our models (see Mooney & Duval, 1993 , for details on bootstrapping). This procedure allowed us to compare the original standard errors against those produced by the bootstrap method. We found no evidence that the standard errors produced by our analytic approach were materially different from those produced by the bootstrap method.
The model contains a large number of variables and it is possible that some are collinear. We ran extensive diagnostic tests for multicollinearity and the only correlation that was significant is between the Iowa dummy and the state characteristics. When state characteristics, which vary over time, were included in the enrollment regression, the Iowa dummy variable was no longer significant.
The simulations conducted above document the utility of developing an integrated model in that one can examine how student expectations are related to their probabilities of applying and enrolling and how differences in expectations and aid actualizations affect these decisions.
Limitations
Although the study presented above moves us toward a more detailed understanding of the structure of student choice, as with all studies there are limitations. We noted that the college decision process is composed of several decision stages. While our model included the search and choice stages, we did not model the first stage (aspirations). Instead, we took the outcomes of this stage and included these variables as exogenous determinants of later decisions. This may have resulted in some bias. We also used total aid paid to students as the aid measure, yet we know that aid effects vary by the type of aid and the timing of aid (DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 1999 , 2002a , 2002b St. John, 1990) . Of course, disaggregating aid would further complicate an already quite complex model.
In the model estimated above, we included average four-year tuition in the state of residence as a measure of competing institutions' tuition rates, but we lack information on private tuition at competing institutions. Inclusion of more detailed data on public and private tuition would permit us to estimate more accurately how responsive University of Iowa enrollments are to prices (and price changes) at competing institutions.
The research conducted and reported above utilized data from a single institution of higher education, so the generalizability of the findings is not known. The model indicates that Iowa provides enough information to students to allow them to make inferences about chances of admission and financial aid. The model may not be appropriate for institutions that provide little information to students. Further testing of the model on other institutions will provide further evidence of its applicability.
Conclusions
Our study improves upon prior student choice research by jointly modeling application, admission, financial aid determination, and enrollment behavior, thereby correcting for the possible selection bias that may occur when enrollment is modeled without consideration of these other decisions. In doing so, we are able to simulate how a host of factors affect not only enrollment behavior but also application propensities.
We found that aid expectations have powerful non-linear and asymmetric effects on enrollment propensities. The effects of aid, both actual and predicted, vary depending on the base from which one starts and the dollar value of the aid increments. The most important finding is that disappointing students with regard to their aid expectations can have serious negative effects on enrollment. These findings represent a contribution to the student choice literature because, although some researchers have argued that students act on the basis of their expectations (Curs & Singell, 2002; Fuller, Manski, & Wise, 1982) , few (if any) investigators have developed a model capable of testing these assumptions and some analysts even think that it is impossible to do so.
We also found that application behavior is related to the probability of admission and the expectation of aid, and we demonstrated that these results can be used to simulate how changes in these variables affect student application probabilities. Like other student choice research, we found that enrollment chances increase with income and that these probabilities vary by race/ethnicity within a particular income group. We
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found that the probabilities of enrollment at the study institution increase as the average tuition in a non-resident student's home state increases, although we did not find that enrollment was discouraged by rising tuition at the study institution.
We believe that integrated models such as the one presented here improve our collective understanding of the interactions among application, admission, financial aid expectations, and enrollment behavior. Not only is the research conducted herein of academic interest, our simulations demonstrate that these models also have practical utility in that they can be used to simulate the impacts of changes in the factors that affect the structure of college choice. Endnotes 1 When the tests are administered, students also complete a questionnaire that contains information about their college preferences, attitudes, and plans. This data is a rich source of information, one that tends to be underutilized by educational researchers.
2 Linsenmeirer, Rosen, and Rouse (2002) demonstrate that if African American students have lower expected future earnings, then they will be more averse to financing their education through debt. If this is the case, African American students will be more responsive than are White students to a shift in financial aid from loans to grants.
3 See Bishop 1977 for a discussion of the possible endogeneity of high school performance. 4 When modeling dichotomous outcomes such as whether students apply, are admitted, and/or enroll (or not) to an institution, logistic regression is often used (the rationale for this choice can be found in Dey & Astin, 1993; Hanushek & Jackson, 1977; Long, 1997) . Unless otherwise noted, the models discussed in this article are logistic regression models. 5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this manuscript for suggesting this point. 6 A colleague suggested using a Tobit model for aid determination instead of using a logit and OLS model to estimate aid receipt and aid amount, respectively. The Tobit model is an extension of a logit (or probit) model that incorporates the actual values of the non-censored observations (see Greene, 1993, and Johnston & DiNardo, 1987 , for further discussion). However, using the Tobit imposes cross-equation constraints on the effects of the explanatory variables in the aid receipt equation and the aid amount equation (given receipt). By estimating separate models for aid receipt and aid amount (given receipt), our approach imposes no such cross-equation constraints.
